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One consequence of international law’s recent historical turn has been to sharpen methodological 
contrasts between intellectual history and international law.  Scholars including Antony Anghie, 
Anne Orford, Rose Parfitt, and Martti Koskenniemi have taken on board historians’ interest in 
contingency and context but pointedly relaxed historians’ traditional stricture against presentist 
instrumentalism.  This essay argues that such a move disrupts a longstanding division of labor 
between history and international law and ultimately brings international legal method closer to 
literature and literary scholarship.  The essay therefore details several more or less endemic ways 
in which literature and literary studies confront challenges of presentism, anachronism, meaning, 
and time.  Using examples from writers as diverse as Anghie, Spinoza, Geoffrey Hill, Emily St. 
John Mandel, China Miéville, John Hollander, Pascale Casanova, Matthew Nicholson, John 
Selden, Shakespeare, and Dante, it proposes a “trilateral” discussion among historians, 
international lawyers, and literary scholars that takes seriously the multipolar disciplinary field in 
which each of these disciplines makes and sustains relations with each of the others.        
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History, Literature, and Authority in International Law 
 
Christopher N. Warren 
   
 
  The lawyer saith what men have determined; the 
historian what men have done. 
      - Philip Sidney, Apology for Poetry (c. 1579) 
 
Writing "On the Interpretation of Scripture" in his Tractatus Theologicus-Politicus of 1670, 
the heretical Amsterdam philosopher Benedict Spinoza controversially proposed an uninhibited 
inquiry into the making of the Biblical canon:  "Our historical study," he wrote, "should set forth 
the circumstances relevant to all the extant books of the prophets, giving the life, character and 
pursuits of the author of every book, detailing who he was, on what occasion and at what time 
and for whom and in what language he wrote.  Again, it should relate what happened to each 
book, how it was first received, into whose hands it fell, how many variant versions there were, 
by whose decision it was received into the canon, and, finally, how all the books, now 
universally regarded as sacred, were united into a single whole.  All these details, I repeat, should 
be available from an historical study of Scripture."1  The passage, which neatly illustrates 
Spinoza's larger project to bring Revelation's fanciful and often destabilizing truth claims under 
the jurisdiction of philosophical reason, is the epitaph to Pascale Casanova's magisterial The 
World Republic of Letters (1999; English, 2004) and underpins her own analysis, in which 
Casanova, like a contemporary Spinoza, sought to pierce the celebratory myths of equal 
                                                            
1 Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ed. Seymour Feldman, trans. Samuel 
Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 90. 
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participation and literary genius by describing the true sociological procedures by which literary 
texts entered into the canon of world literature.    
I start with Spinoza and Casanova to clear space for what I hope will be a trilateral 
methodological conversation among literary critics, historians, and scholars of international law.   
My primary concern follows from recent controversies over method among historians of 
international law that have exposed methodological divisions between intellectual historians, on 
the one hand, and legal scholars on the other.  The chief matter of controversy concerns the role 
of anachronism, a charge leveled by a few historians at some international legal scholars but 
which other international legal scholars have embraced in the face of historians' evident 
displeasure.  The controversies, in my view, offer a remarkable opportunity to examine deeply 
seated disciplinary suppositions within history, literature, and international law.  As Johan 
Heilbron has written, the academy is organized "into structures of judgment and authority which 
are founded on a disciplinary division of labor.  This division of labor is an institutional 
arrangement, inseparably consisting of cognitive and social structures, that is of fairly coherent 
sets of concepts, questions, references, and methods, and a corresponding social order of 
acknowledged specialists in departments, committees, and professional associations."2  As we 
shall see, there are meaningful divisions of labor between history and international law, but part 
of my point here is also to insist that our understanding of those divisions of labor remains 
impoverished in some important respects because the cognitive and social structures of literature 
and literary studies have largely been absent from this conversation.3 
                                                            
2 Johan Heilbron, “A Regime of Disciplines: Toward a Historical Sociology of Disciplinary 
Knowledge,” in The Dialogical Turn, ed. Charles Camic and Hans Joas (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004), 23.  
3 A conference called "History, Politics, Law: Thinking Through the International" was held 
at Cambridge University in May 2016, but literary scholars and literary considerations were 
notably absent. 
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To propose a "trilateral" discussion, then, is on the one hand an effort to bring together 
conversations that have long taken place separately under the terms "law and literature" or "law 
and history" and, on the other, an attempt to pick apart the overly broad organizing framework of 
"law and the humanities."  The recent debates occasioned by international law's 
"historiographical turn" help remind us that disciplines, like nations, have multiple relations.4  
And just as the relations I'm considering cannot be reduced to the names of "law and literature" 
or "law and history," neither is the name "law and the humanities" fully adequate to the task.  
While "law and literature" leaves out history and "law and history" excludes literature, "law and 
the humanities" implicitly collapses literature and history into a single whole.  Such tendencies 
mirror the ages in which they've dominated: if the equipoised double structures of "law and 
literature" and "law and history" that first took hold in the academy in the 1960s and 1970s 
exhibited the balancing relationality of the Cold War, its broader successor "law and humanities" 
reproduced globalization's centralizing, unifying force.  My intention here is to acknowledge 
meaningful disciplinary boundaries among law, history, and literature by considering the 
multipolar disciplinary field in which each of the disciplines makes and sustains relations with 
each of the others. 
 What follows comes in two main parts: "Anachronism in History and International Law" and 
"Literature and Anachronism."  In part I, I summarize the debates over historicism in 
international law, using Spinoza and the problem of legitimate authority to crystallize their 
stakes.  In part II, I turn to discuss several examples of literature and literary scholarship in this 
multipolar relational field that, as I've suggested, remains underserved by the appellations "law 
                                                            
4 George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, “Martti Koskenniemi and the Historiographical Turn in 
International Law,” European Journal of International Law 16, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 539–59; 
Bernadette Meyler, “Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle,” in New Directions in 
Law and Literature, ed. Elizabeth S. Anker and Bernadette Meyler (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 160–75. 
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and literature," "law and history," or "law and the humanities."  One of my central contentions is 
that disputants over anachronism in international legal history can learn from literary texts and 
literary studies, which house an extensive and growing toolkit for transmitting meaning in and 
through time. The recent fissures that have emerged in international legal history between 
intellectual historians and historians of international law have a distinct counterpart in literary 
studies where a somewhat improbable coalition of traditionalists, Straussians, deconstructionists, 
post-colonialists, feminists, eco-critics, queer scholars and others have joined together to 
question dominant historical methodologies.5  "Restiveness with historicism," as Rita Felski puts 
it, "is beginning to make itself felt."6  But I also engage with these debates as a way to speak 
back to literary scholars and to illustrate how reading and contributing to these disputes might 
enliven literary scholarship.  Tensions in literary scholarship between formalism and historicism, 
presentism and anachronism, post-colonialism and world literature, global North and global 
South approaches, and so forth are hardly literary scholars’ alone, and the ways we deal with 
such tensions can interact with parallel dynamics in adjacent fields—if we let them.    
 
                                                            
5 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon, 
“Queering History,” PMLA 120, no. 5 (2005): 1608–17; A. D. Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: 
Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 197–222; Evelyn Gajowski, “Beyond 
Historicism: Presentism, Subjectivity, Politics,” Literature Compass 7, no. 8 (2010): 674–691; J. 
Hillis Miller, “Anachronistic Reading,” Derrida Today 3, no. 1 (May 1, 2010): 75–91, 
https://doi.org/10.3366/drt.2010.0006; Paul Sheehan and Helen Groth, eds., “The Uses of 
Anachronism [Special Issue],” Textual Practice 26, no. 4 (August 2012): 571–806; Valerie 
Traub, “The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies,” PMLA 128, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 21–39, 
https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2013.128.1.21; Jeffrey Insko, “Anachronistic Imaginings: Hope 
Leslie’s Challenge to Historicism,” American Literary History 16, no. 2 (April 13, 2004): 179–
207; “Manifesto of the V21 Collective,” V21 (blog), accessed March 17, 2018, 
http://v21collective.org/manifesto-of-the-v21-collective-ten-theses/.   
6 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2015), 155.  
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I. Anachronism in History and International Law 
 
To understand the “turf war” presently underway, one needs to know that the last two 
decades have seen a so-called "historiographical turn" in international law.7  In one sense, this is 
a counterintuitive development since it is difficult to imagine international law without history.  
"All law seems to be about history at one level or another and perhaps has always been," 
Matthew Craven has observed.8  "Yet it is equally evident," he writes—and this is the crux—
"that the intellectual frame of rule-finding or policy-prescription also not infrequently involves 
an effacement of the historical character of the materials in question and the displacement of 
'unnecessary' contextual factors of cause and explanation that might otherwise be of interest."9  
The turn to context has therefore been the most significant aspect of the historical turn.  In 1999, 
historian of political thought Richard Tuck, for instance, published The Rights of War and 
Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant and in 2004 the 
Finnish legal scholar Martti Koskenniemi called for an "intellectual history of international law" 
taking into account the "intellectual, social, and political environment[s]" of legal ideologies and 
especially "neighboring areas such as private law, international relations or political theory and 
philosophy."10  Koskenniemi's suggestion, soon taken up with enthusiasm in the pages of the 
newly-formed Journal of the History of International Law, was that legal scholars open their 
canons and methods to the salutary approach of historians of political thought like Tuck, J.G.A. 
                                                            
7 Valentina Vadi, “International Law and Its Histories: Methodological Risks and 
Opportunities,” Harvard International Law Journal 58 (2017): 321; Galindo, “Martti 
Koskenniemi and the Historiographical Turn in International Law.” 
8 Matthew Craven, “The Invention of a Tradition: Westlake, the Berlin Conference and the 
Historicisation of International Law,” in Constructing International Law: The Birth of a 
Discipline, ed. Luigi Nuzzo (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012), 365.  
9 Craven, 365.  
10 Martti Koskenniemi, “Why History of International Law Today?,” Rechtgeschichte 4 
(2004).  
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Pocock, and Quentin Skinner, whose turn beginning in the late 1960s to speech-act theory and 
rhetorical contexts had proved capable of invigorating overly dry, deterministic, and ultimately 
anachronistic histories of ideas.  As Skinner had written in a foundational essay, "classic texts are 
concerned with their own quite alien problems," not our own.11  The scholarly task was to 
reconstruct historical context fully enough to understand these "alien problems" and show how 
authors and their texts intervened in their particular moments.  Historian of international law 
Randall Lesaffer took this to mean "mak[ing] use of the basic rules of historical methodology” 
and  "approach[ing] the past with proper respect."12  The “professional commitment to context 
and an avoidance of cause-driven history” involved developing a keen sensitivity to anachronism 
and subordinating presentist legal-political concerns.13 
In a certain sense, the growing sensitivity to anachronism was less a wholesale innovation 
than a return to methods that Spinoza and other writers honed in early modernity.  Scholars 
including Peter Burke, Thomas Greene, and Constantin Fasolt have argued that it was only 
during the Renaissance that Europeans even began to sense the possibility of anachronism.14  
Prior to that, history was too deeply attached to the project of moral instruction to engender a 
                                                            
11 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” in Visions of 
Politics, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57–89. 
12 Randall Lesaffer, “International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love,” in 
Time, History and International Law, ed. Matthew C. R. Craven, M. Fitzmaurice, and Maria 
Vogiatzi (Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 2007), 37.  
13 Samuel Moyn, “Legal History as a Source of International Law: The Politics of 
Knowledge,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, ed. Samantha 
Besson and Jean d’Aspremont (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 317, 
http://ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198745365.0
01.0001. 
14 Peter Burke, “The Renaissance Sense of Anachronism,” Die Renaissance Und Ihr Bild in 
Der Geschichte, 1998, 17–35; Thomas M Greene, The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in 
Renaissance Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).  
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sense of historical process.15  The then-dominant feeling that examples and analogies from the 
past could inform action in the present helped secure history from the countervailing notion of 
the past as a locus of difference.16  Yet Renaissance humanists, in the process of searching out 
late interpolations into the text of the Roman Digest, began to invest juridical thinking with a 
new awareness of a differentiated past.  In the short term, chronology aided the project of 
identifying spurious legal authorities.  In the longer term, Renaissance historicism helped draw 
historicism's most basic distinction: the one between present and past.  Spinoza's biblical 
criticism worked similarly.  To medievalism's fourfold hermeneutic schema (literal, allegorical, 
moral, and anagogic), Spinoza added a radically destabilizing temporal dimension.17  Early 
modern literature shows signs that this new forensic historicism was also opening up new 
opportunities for literary writers.  Renaissance theater became adept, in Lorna Hutson's words, at 
"activating time-related topic questions such as 'when' or 'how long?' or 'how old?'" which 
"serve[d] as a way of both unifying the action and expanding [dramatic] representation into the 
past and the future."18  Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (1599), for instance, includes an 
anachronistic mechanical clock, which in dramatizing puzzling continuities between ancient 
Rome and early modern London also prompted theatergoers and readers to consider possible 
discontinuities.19  Fundamentally, historicism became a broad-based method to scrutinize 
                                                            
15 Reinhart Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the 
Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process,” in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical 
Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 26–42.  
16 Daniel R. Woolf, “From Hystories to the Historical: Five Transitions in Thinking about the 
Past, 1500–1700,” Huntington Library Quarterly 68, no. 1–2 (March 1, 2005): 33–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1525/hlq.2005.68.1-2.33.  
17 Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and 
History in the French Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).  
18 Lorna Hutson, Circumstantial Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
19 Jeremy Tambling, On Anachronism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 4–5. 
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foundational sources of authority. Its forms of attention were most often meant to liberate the 
present from ill-grounded claims.20    
 
Accordingly, international law's historical turn was not without its own politics.  As 
intellectual historian Peter Gordon has observed, "historicizing [an] idea into the past [often] 
serves to defeat the idea and mark [] it as no longer legitimate."21  Beginning in the 1980s, critical 
legal history had been vaunted as a method that usefully "produces disturbances in the field[,] . . . 
inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress[,] . . . advances rival 
perspectives[,] . . . posits alternative trajectories[, and] . . . unsettles the familiar strategies that 
we use to tame the past in order to normalize the present."22  In short, "history is...a form of 
action."23  What the international lawyers associated with international law's historical turn 
understood quite well was that the formal authority of international law depends on a certain 
kind of useable international historiography.  While rarely stated directly, the "disenchanting 
mode of analysis" of international law's historical turn gave the project a critical Spinozist 
thrust.24  Bringing purportedly "unnecessary contextual factors" into view could effect 
disenchantment and potentially even de-legitimation.25   
                                                            
20 Fasolt, The Limits of History. 
21 Peter E. Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas,” in Rethinking 
Modern European Intellectual History, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 44.  
22 Robert Gordon, “The Arrival of Critical Historicism,” Faculty Scholarship Series, January 
1, 1997, 1024, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1347; quoted in Christopher 
Tomlins, “After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure,” Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 8, no. 1 (2012): 31–68, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102811-
173811.  
23 Fasolt, The Limits of History, 14.  
24 Tomlins, “After Critical Legal History,” 38.  
25 Craven, “The Invention of a Tradition,” 365; Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the 
History of Ideas,” 44.  
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The text of Article 38 of the 1920 Statute of the International Court of Justice shows why.  
According to Article 38, the legitimate sources of international law are: (1.) "international 
conventions," meaning bilateral and multilateral treaties, (2.) "International custom" 
(longstanding historical practice), (3.) "The general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations" and (4.) "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations."26  Historical scholarship impinges at least indirectly on each of these, and 
perhaps most directly on "teachings...of the various nations" and what's understood as 
"international custom."27  But here, as Koskenniemi's earlier work had shown, the discrediting 
charge of apologia always hovers, which is why international law requires something perceived 
as a "pure" history, one as uncontaminated as possible by pique and prejudice.28  According to 
Matthew Craven, "to make explicit the particularity of the context and explore the specificities of 
motive or cause – is to make it all the less relevant as a generalisable experience from which 
contemporary legal rules might be deduced."29 In the preface to his 1618 book The History of 
Tithes, John Selden showed that he had intuited much the same.  Declaring his work "meer 
narration," he renounced any rhetorical intent.  The History of Tithes, he proclaimed, was "not 
written to prove that Tithes are not due by the Law of God; not written to prove that the Laitie 
                                                            
26 ICJ Article 38 
27 Rose Parfitt, “The Spectre of Sources,” European Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 
(February 1, 2014): 297–306, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chu011; Thomas Skouteris, “The Force 
of a Doctrine: Art. 38 of the PCIJ Statute and the Sources of International Law,” in Events: The 
Force of International Law, ed. Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce, and Sundhya Pahuja (Routledge-
Cavendish, 2011), 69–80; David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Reginald G. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law and 
Custom of the Sea ([London]: Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1915); Brian Tierney, 
“Vitoria and Suarez on Ius Gentium, Natural Law, and Custom,” in The Nature of Customary 
Law, ed. Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 101–24; Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati, “Withdrawing from 
International Custom,” Yale Law Journal 120 (2010): 202–75.  
28 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
29 Craven, “The Invention of a Tradition,” 366.  
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may detaine them, not to prove that Lay hands may still enjoy maintenance of the 
Clergie.  Neither is it any thing else but it self, that is, a meer Narration, and the Historie of 
Tithes."30  Selden, himself a common lawyer who would go on to compose the famous Mare 
Clausum (1635), one of the key early texts concerning the law of the sea, understood as well as 
anyone the law's own needs.  Law needs objective inquirers, faithful servants of positive facts. 
The norm-laden stuff of advocates, partisans, and ideologues, of embodied rhetorical actors with 
subjective passions and interests, cannot credibly be made international law.31  A functionalist 
international law, that is, requires a non-functionalist history, "meer narration," a history that 
accepts that some legal questions endure through time. 
 One consequence of Article 38's reference to the "teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations" as "means"—albeit "subsidiary"—"for the determinations of 
rules of law" is that "the sources of international law were (and, hence, to 'subsidiary' degree still 
are) identified with the treatises of the 'fathers of international law' – men such as Vitoria, 
Suarez, Gentili, Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf."32  International law's historical turn has therefore 
shown intense interest in such thinkers.  As such, the disparate responses to two representative 
works of this turn can be instructive.  In 2004, historian David Armitage published a deeply 
contextualized critical edition of Hugo Grotius' 1608 legal treatise Mare Liberum, placing a work 
often venerated as international law scripture by progressive international lawyers squarely 
within the challenging milieu of Dutch East Indies Company propaganda.  And legal scholar 
Antony Anghie published his 2004 monograph Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
                                                            
30 John Selden, The Historie of Tithes: That Is, the Practice of Payment of Them. The Positiue 
Laws Made for Them. The Opinions Touching the Right of Them (London, 1618).  
31 I draw this wording from my Literature and the Law of Nations, 1580-1680 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  On legal history’s avoidance of normativity, see further Steven 
Wilf, “Law/Text/Past,” UC Irvine Law Review 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 543; Meyler, “Law, 
Literature, and History,” 167. 
32 Parfitt, “The Spectre of Sources,” 298.  
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International Law, arguing that 16th-century Salamanca jurist Francisco Vitoria, far from being 
the moderating brake on Spanish imperialism, in fact inaugurated a European tradition of 
exploitation under the banner of legal restraint.   
While Armitage's edition found positive reception, Anghie's book irked some historians of 
ideas including Ian Hunter and Georg Cavallar, the former of whom found the book "dogged by 
debilitating anachronism and presentism."33  According to Hunter, "It is this late nineteenth-
century use of state sovereignty as an instrument of trans-territorial imperial hegemony that 
[Anghie's] critical historiography anachronistically projects backward onto early modern jus 
gentium [law of nations]."34  In effect, Anghie was charged with violating what Constantin Fasolt 
terms historians' "most basic principle of method: thou shalt place everything in the context of its 
time."35  "Show that a historian has unwittingly infected the interpretation of the past with some 
particle of the present, and you have shown the historian not only to have failed at the task, but to 
have failed shamefully."36   
The criticism of Anghie's Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) might have 
passed as so much run-of-the-mill "policing of anachronism" were it not for the subsequent 
observations of international legal scholar Anne Orford, who came to Anghie's defense, 
discerning in the criticism deep methodo-political tensions long elided in international law's 
                                                            
33 Ian Hunter, “Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law 
of Nature and Nations,” Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought : Transpositions of 
Empire, 2010, 11–29; Georg Cavallar, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: 
Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?,” Journal of the 
History of International Law / Revue d’histoire Du Droit International 10, no. 2 (October 1, 
2008): 181–209, https://doi.org/10.1163/157180508X359828. 
34 Hunter, “Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics,” 20. 
35 Fasolt, The Limits of History. 
36 Fasolt. 
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historical turn.37  As Orford writes, "Law and history stand on the opposite sides of the dividing 
line between present obligations and archaic traditions.  The self-imposed task of today's 
contextualist historians is to think about concepts in their proper time and place – the task of 
international lawyers is to think about how concepts move across time and space."38  The 
responses to Anghie were "contextualism as containment."39  Anghie had studied Vitoria and his 
imperialist context not to posit a break between European colonialism and contemporary 
structures of international law, but instead to show a troubling continuity.  His intent, in his 
words, was "to illuminate the processes, the barely visible thoroughfares by which this colonial 
history insinuates itself into the discipline [of international law] with enduring and far-reaching 
effect."40  Rather than implicitly constructing a bad "then" and a better "now," Anghie's book 
rejected any such break in favor of the disquieting impression that the moral contagion of 
colonialism had not, in fact, been quarantined in the past.   
 As Orford pointed out, there was something very lawyerly about this approach, and not 
only because of its inbuilt logic of offense and remedy.  It also presented the past for the 
purposes of the present.  If legal argument involves mobilizing sources, cases, thinkers, and 
doctrines, Anghie's too was a legal past that could authorize—indeed require—action.  Anghie 
may have reversed the moral valance by turning the standard encomia of the "forefathers" into 
critique, but his "judicialization" of Vitoria was truer to the essence of international legal 
                                                            
37 Anne Orford, “Meaning and Understanding in International Law and Intellectual History” 
(History, Politics, Law: Thinking Through the International, University of Cambridge, May 16, 
2016), https://vimeo.com/171268469. 
38 Anne Orford, “The Past as Law or History?: The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern 
International Law,” International Law and Justice Working Papers, IILJ Working Papers, no. 2 
(2012), www.iilj.org. 
39 Orford, “Meaning and Understanding in International Law and Intellectual History.”   
Orford is here quoting Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas.” 
40 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 312.  
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scholarship than to the discipline of history.41  "International legal method," Orford claimed, is 
"necessarily anachronistic."42  Whether consciously or not, Anghie's critics were dissolving a 
source of political authority by applying the very same solvent that Spinoza had applied to Holy 
Scripture, that Casanova had applied to the literary world system, and that Armitage had applied 
to the so-called "father of international law" Hugo Grotius. 
 
II. Literature and Anachronism 
 
Orford is surely right that Anghie brought an international legal sensibility to Imperialism, 
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law—one of Anghie's first critical interlocutors 
used the distinctly juridical term "accomplice" to characterize Anghie's view of Vitoria—but we 
miss something critically important about the interplay of humanities methods and international 
law unless we recognize a slightly submerged but no less relevant literary sensibility as well.43   
International law’s recent fascination with contexts has been oddly silent about literary contexts 
even though Ed Morgan has pointed out that “in interdisciplinary mode [international law] 
parallels, like a Nabokovian pale fire, the literary and aesthetic currents that surround it.”44  For 
much of the twentieth century, literature worked much like international law, and in part because 
of history.  The traditional division of labor between international law and international history—
in which history was a stable source of facts, customs, doctrines, treaties, and so forth and law 
the locus of norms and prescriptions—had, as a consequence, a second division of labor 
                                                            
41 Henry Rousso, The Haunting Past: History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary France, 
trans. Ralph Schoolcraft (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 50.  
42 Anne Orford, “On International Legal Method,” London Review of International Law 1, 
no. 1 (September 1, 2013): 175, https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lrt005. 
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involving literature and literary scholarship.  Hans-Georg Gadamer was among those most 
eloquent in observing that "literature does not exist as the dead remnant of an alienated being, 
left over from a later time as simultaneous with its experiential reality.  Literature is a function of 
being intellectually preserved and handed down, and therefore brings its hidden history into 
every age."45  Literary texts, like international legal cases and doctrines have "busy afterli[ves]."46  
As such, they not only frustrate historicism's "stricture of recognizing the past in the present" but 
also potentially even frustrate the clear distinction between the two.47  It was novelist William 
Faulker who wrote in Requiem for a Nun, "The past is never dead. It's not even past."48   
Such generalities are true enough for Anghie, but in Anghie's case it is possible to be even 
more precise.  Anghie quotes novelist Joseph Conrad while citing the influence of postcolonial 
literary critics Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak among others.  Postcolonial 
literary studies is deeply presentist "in principle if not in name," and it is noteworthy that 
Anghie's own intellectual formation includes an undergraduate specialization in postcolonial 
literature at Australia's Monash University.49  While literary studies is of course a big and diverse 
tent, the postcolonialist scholars who influenced Anghie are themselves among the sharpest 
critics of historicist contextualism.  A shared point of emphasis has been in noting the easy 
slippage between geographical difference and chronological difference that creates the powerful 
(if laughably illogical) category of "contemporary ancestors."50  Kathleen Davis writes about the 
rise of historicism, for instance, that "There was no....'superstitious, feudal Middle Ages' before 
                                                            
45 See Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. W. Glen-Doepel, Joel Weinsheimer, 
and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd, rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 2004), 154. 
46 Felski, The Limits of Critique, 160.  
47 Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas,” 45.  
48 William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, 1950. 
49 Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, “Introduction: Presenting Presentism,” in Presentist 
Shakespeares (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5.  
50 Mary Nyquist, “Contemporary Ancestors of de Bry, Hobbes, and Milton,” University of 
Toronto Quarterly 77, no. 3 (2008): 837–75. 
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colonialism, and doubtless there never would have been such without colonialism; vice versa, 
colonizers could not have mapped and administered foreign lands and bodies as they did without 
the simultaneous process of imagining such a 'Middle Ages."51  Postcolonialists are all too aware 
that historicism has often been an instrument for self-congratulation on one side and domination 
on the other.    
If Anghie's approach toward the past joins a juridical approach to history with literary 
postcolonialism’s skepticism of historicized difference, the argument he develops about formal 
sovereignty doctrine further suggests the influence of literary studies.  Anghie shares with 
literary scholars the impulse to use form to draw continuities between past and present.  In the 
sense that the formal sovereignty doctrine first developed by Vitoria in the sixteenth century in 
Anghie's view retains at the structural level the colonial impulse that modern international law 
habitually disclaims, Anghie's approach bears comparison with genre theorists in literary studies 
for whom literary genres like epic, tragedy, novel, and so forth are durable diachronic structures.  
Frederic Jameson, for instance, argues that literary "form, secreted like a shell or exoskeleton, 
continues to emit its ideological message long after the extinction of its host."52  The formal 
aspects of genre and doctrine, in other words, counteract the contextualist impulse to draw a 
sharp line between present and past, creating instead cross-pollinating methodological affinities 
between what Orford terms "international legal method" and literary studies.53 
It is worth mentioning for any readers from other disciplines that historicism is no less 
troublesome in literary studies than it is in international law.  Postcolonialists and presentists 
                                                            
51 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and 
Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 20.  
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exist on one side of a spectrum that also includes new historicists and historical materialists, 
themselves vigorously attentive to "circumstances relevant to all the extant books … giving the 
life, character and pursuits of the author of every book, detailing who he was," etc. In my own 
subfield of early modern literary studies, historicism over the last forty years has been closely 
associated with efforts to pierce myths of otherworldly genius—frequently Shakespeare's.  The 
generation-long dominance of historicism has meant that anachronism continues to "serve as a 
cudgel with which to beat other scholars."54  The claims that all literary texts are composed in a 
particular time and place and that those times and places are relevant to interpretation find 
relatively few detractors in today's literary studies, but the field tends to bifurcate there.  The 
problem is, literary meaning is synchronic and diachronic, and both axes are available for study.  
Some scholars dig deeply into intellectual and material contexts while others attend to further 
meanings and pleasures unexhausted by synchronic contextualization.  For the latter, models 
based on sound waves (Dimock), ghosts (Derrida), tradition (Jarvis), composting (Mentz), 
wormholes (Charnes), genetics (Moretti), palimpsests (Gil Harris), networks (Liu), and influence 
(Bloom) have been developed in Gadamer's footsteps.55  
  What thoughtful readers of literature know, in addition, is that literary writers have their 
own rich set of techniques for making meaning move through time.  A non-exhaustive list of 
                                                            
54 Steve Mentz, “The Two Anachronisms: An Ecocritical Response to a Review,” Glasgow 
Review of Books (blog), February 27, 2017, https://glasgowreviewofbooks.com/2017/02/27/the-
two-anachronisms-an-ecocritical-response-to-a-review-by-steve-mentz/. 
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strategies might include genre, translation, verse, diction, and style.  For dramatists, performance 
is recurrent renovation.  Even the briefest of allusions can knit past and present in striking ways.  
Consider the following examples from poets Geoffrey Hill and John Hollander and novelists 
Emily St. John Mandel and China Miéville.  The very title of Geoffrey Hill's 1996 eight-poem 
poetic sequence De Jure Belli ac Pacis, for instance, evokes the impetus for, and reception 
history of, Hugo Grotius' 1625 magnum opus of the same name. Hill’s is a characteristically 
complex poetic sequence, dedicated to the German jurist and diplomat Hans-Bernd von Haeften 
(1905-44), a conspirator against Hitler whose subsequent execution by the Third Reich was 
preceded by von Haefton’s declaration, "Legally speaking it is treason; actually it is not.”  In 
Hill’s poems, 20th-century European “history … is recurrently represented as ‘poetry’ – images 
and cadences of a lyrical power often akin to the working of music – although this ‘poeticising’ 
is not confined to the literary genre of verse but is ubiquitous in our representations of the past.”56  
If, as in Hill’s sequence, “our history and present time can seem a collage relieved of reasoning 
connection,” the Grotian title suggests the role not of law but of poetry in offering “an over-
arching order, a codification and means of resolution” with ambitions at once as grand, 
necessary, and futile as Grotius’ magnum opus.57  
In her 2014 novel Station Eleven, similarly, the Canadian writer Emily St. John Mandel 
imagines a global flu pandemic whose few survivors turn to art and theater to repair the delicate 
fabric of civilization.  While globalization's widespread international exchange helps transmit 
Station Eleven's initial pandemic across distance, the novel distinguishes itself among the wider 
body of post-apocalyptic fiction using references to Shakespeare to create its own trans-temporal 
                                                            
56 Jeffrey Wainwright, “History as Poetry: ‘Churchill’s Funeral’ and ‘De Jure Belli Ac Pacis’ 
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Manchester University Press, 2005), 65. 
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flows.  Mandel’s novel probes the distinctions (if any there be) between influence and influenza.  
While a main character, Miranda, for example, shares a name with the very character in 
Shakespeare's The Tempest who wonders about a "brave new world," the novel draws most 
deeply from King Lear and Lear's profound meditation on the proposition that 
"Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal."  The actors and 
musicians of Station Eleven's Traveling Symphony proceed on the basis of their own embodied 
intuitions about art's role in human flourishing: "Survival," they proclaim, "is insufficient."  
Patient zero in Mandel's pandemic is a Shakespearean actor named Arthur Leander, whose 
legacy generates the novel's three main plot lines, which follow Leander's three ex-wives à la 
Lear's three daughters.  That Leander's surname contracts so easily to “Lear” emphasizes the 
point most clearly.  Literary influence, which Mandel’s novel might encourage us to call the 
Shakespearean flu, is ultimately a salvific contagion thankfully capable of leaping from past to 
present in Station Eleven, and not through genre—novels and tragedies are after all very 
different—but instead by transmitting and mutating Lear's own binaries of nature and culture 
through intertextual allusion.  
The contemporary writer perhaps most relevant to this essay's concerns is the Marxist 
novelist China Miéville, who leads a second life as a well-known theorist of international law.58   
Miéville's richly imaginative novels bring into their worlds a long tradition of speculative and 
utopian fiction.  The floating city of Miéville's The Scar, for example, is able invoke nearly 500 
years of mercantilism, capitalism, and colonialism through its subtle reworkings of Thomas 
                                                            
58 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory Of International Law (Chicago: 
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More's Utopia (1516). "Utopias are necessary," he writes in his own recent edition of Utopia,  
"but not only are they insufficient: they can, in some iterations, be part of the ideology of the 
system, the bad totality that organises us, warms the skies, and condemns millions to peonage on 
garbage scree."59  Miéville's characters in his New Crobuzon trilogy include a group called the 
Remade, criminals whose Dante-esque punishments are written on their bodies through 
grotesque transformations intended, in Miéville's world, to aid penal labor.60  Evoking Dante’s 
own world to remind us of a period when “the "brutal," had not yet been veiled by the habits of 
civility and the pacification of modem life,” the violence of such punishments both literalizes for 
readers the violence of a capitalist world-system in need of ever more cheap labor for its 
reproduction and evokes Inferno to link that violence to older medieval forms.61   
A poem that asks questions related to Miéville's Remade, albeit using techniques native to 
poetry and with a more playful, sartorial tone, is American poet John Hollander's "Tailor-
Made"—a poem published, notably, in a New-York based journal in October 2001.62  In the 
immediate wake of the 11 September attacks, Hollander's three ABBA quatrains ask, "How can a 
punishment fit a crime? / What's not ill-suited to a wrong?" before turning to an example from 
Dante's Inferno to suggest that "being light / In a heavy, dark and wrenching wind / Didn't drape" 
particularly well on Dante's famously lustful pair, Paolo and Francesca.  Dante's tightly 
systematic terza rima, which goes hand in hand with his ostensibly systematic scheme of 
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punishments, is here subjected to Hollander's scrutiny by way of Hollander's own highly self-
conscious infelicities in meter and rhyme.  "Fit" is precisely what rhymes like crime/overtime, 
wind/kind and frayed/underplayed don't do.  Poetic regularity—regula is Latin for rule—is a 
Sisyphean task.  As syntactic units overflow their lines in "Tailor-Made," syllables range 
irregularly between seven and nine per line, literalizing in a slightly different way the poem's 
concluding rejoinder to Dante at the intersection of aesthetics and penal theory: "The overkill, 
the underplayed / Will always have an ugly look." Examples like Hill, St. Mandel, Miéville and 
Hollander remind us in some very different ways of the many resources literature has at its 
disposal to help writers stitch time together.  
That each of these more diachronic approaches continues to draw in one way or another on 
temporality can remind us that literary and legal studies' shared interest in what persists through 
time doesn't mean that literary and international legal methods necessarily must reject the critical 
Spinozist impulse.  As Martti Koskenniemi has acknowledged, part of the appeal of international 
law's historical turn was the chance to craft "better narratives."63  Anghie's work in particular 
shows how Spinozist contextualism might be avoided on one level but powerfully applied on a 
different plane of analysis.  For this reason, I find Orford entirely convincing in noticing a 
difference in international lawyers' temporalities but not quite right to tie international legal 
method and anachronism so completely.  Chronology remains as fundamental to Anghie's 
analysis as it is to Pascale Casanova's The World Republic of Letters, for example, and not 
simply as an organizing principle.  What chronology enables for both Anghie and Casanova is 
detailed attention to moments of entrance, of recognition, of what theater scholars might prefer to 
call "entering the world stage."  In Anghie's legal framework, recognition concerns 
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sovereignty—international legal personhood.  In Casanova's literary sense, it means enjoying 
global literary prestige.  But the Spinozist template renders both the international legal system 
and the world literary system as made objects akin to the canonical Bible or a stage play and as 
such characterized by time-stamped inclusions and exclusions and available for chronological 
scrutiny.   
Chronology in these analyses is both a method and subject of inquiry.  Global literary 
prestige and international legal personality are both governed by what Casanova terms a "logic 
of temporal competition" in which lateness is a "handicap."64  If scripture could seem to 
Spinoza's contemporaries a unified whole, each book as equal in its claim to divine revelation as 
the next, it was largely because it had been exempted from historicist inquiry.   Reason required 
attending to the hows and whys in the making of this privileged, putatively unified whole.  For 
Anghie and Casanova, the Spinozist concern is less the biographical author's rhetorical intent 
than the historical moment of entrance--sometimes understood in literary studies as "reception."65  
And in fact, international legal personhood and literary prestige are co-constitutive.  Anghie 
writes, "The transformation of colonial territories into sovereign states is central to the claim that 
international law is now truly universal because all societies whether European or non-European, 
participate as equal and sovereign states in the international system."66  But this claim to equality 
and universal participation can never be as convincing as it would like to be due to the 
inescapable timeline over which the international system developed.  As Casanova puts it, "the 
temporal law of the world of letters may be stated thus: it is necessary to be old in order to have 
any chance of being modern or of decreeing what is modern.  In other words, having a long 
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national past is the condition of being able to claim a literary existence that is fully recognized in 
the present."67  For Anghie, colonial international law's long delay in recognizing non-Western 
sovereignty, accomplished through methods such as a supposed "standard of civilization," the 
notion of quasi-sovereignty, and European mandates, similarly perpetuates unequal outcomes 
within contemporary international system's putative society of equals.  Third world and 
postcolonial nations "late" to sovereignty do not enjoy its true privileges nor, late to what 
Casanova terms "Greenwich literary mean time," do they enjoy literary prestige.68  After all, 
Shakespeare's Shylock converts to Christianity at the end of Merchant of Venice, but it matters 
considerably when (and why) he does so. 
The point here is that, far from rejecting Spinozist historicism, many of the literary and 
international legal methods under discussion are in fact quite capable of adapting them to slightly 
different objects.  Their project of demythologizing the international system relies fundamentally 
on a Spinozist interest in the circumstances of reception—moments of admission, membership 
criteria, and the procedures and circumstances of canon making. 
To understand the international system as made in such ways shows—and in part 
facilitates—an openness to the language of poetry, for, as Philip Sidney emphasized in his great 
Apology for Poetry, the term poet "cometh of this word poiein, which is 'to make.'"69  Victoria 
Kahn among others has encouraged us to understand "poiesis not simply as a literary question 
but also as an explicitly political question."70  This is why it is striking to read recent scholars of 
                                                            
67 Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, 89–90. Italics hers.   
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international law like Ralph Michaels and Matthew Nicholson proposing “more creativity, more 
imagination…more willingness to depict alternative worlds.”71  Be more like poets, international 
lawyers are telling their colleagues.   In order to "see international law anew," Nicholson urges 
international legal scholars "to acquire the poet's anxiety and write texts that re-imageine [sic] 
legal practice as something unlimited by 'past texts.'"72   Nicholson's allusion to the poet's anxiety 
refers to the so-called "anxiety of influence" that critic Harold Bloom has long insisted leads 
literary writers to distinguish themselves from their precursors.  In Nicholson's view, legal 
scholars should treat past texts and practitioners not as models to follow but as raw materials for 
a quasi-literary "process of constellating fragments to form a representation of reality."73  The 
inspiration for this latter formulation is Walter Benjamin's "allegorical-representational practice" 
rather than Philip Sidney's Elizabethan poetics, but the rationale is not far from Sidney's own 
imagistic poetics, in which the poem is conceived in part as a "perfect picture": "The lawyer saith 
what men have determined; the historian what men have done," but "only the poet, disdaining to 
be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect 
another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or quite anew..."74  In 
recent proposals by Michaels and Nicholson, international lawyers are invited cast aside the 
discipline’s traditional and often feigned humility and embrace their own agency in world-
making.   
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III.  Conclusion - Divisions of Labor 
 
As we have seen, literature and literary studies confront challenges of presentism, 
anachronism, meaning, and time in various ways.  The reasons such techniques might be of 
interest to international law at the moment is that scholars including Anghie, Orford, Parfitt, and 
Koskenniemi have evidently taken on board historians' interest in contingency and context, but 
"Restiveness with historicism is beginning to make itself felt."75  The examples from Antony 
Anghie, Geoffrey Hill, Emily St. John Mandel, China Miéville, John Hollander, Pascale 
Casanova, Ralph Michaels, and Matthew Nicholson offered opportunities to consider some of 
the distinct affordances of postcolonialist temporalities, formal analysis, allusion, character 
names, plot, fictional geographies, meter, rhyme, enjambment, and poiesis.  Historians and legal 
scholars associated with international law's historical turn largely succeeded in "bring[ing] legal 
principles down from the conceptual heaven and into a real world where agents make claims and 
counterclaims, advancing some agendas, opposing others."76  But a consequence of international 
law's historical turn has been to sharpen methodological contrasts between intellectual history 
and international law.  In line with the Spinozist tradition, it has also raised problematic 
questions about the authority of international law.   
One thing missing in this analysis might be called the aesthetic force of contextualism.  
Contextualism in most accounts is divorced from aesthetic experience, but this need not be the 
case. In positing a break between past and present, historicism opens a space for a kind of 
scholarly sublime.  Meaning that somehow travels over the distance between present and past 
takes on an air of the mysterious—a defiant, spectral, otherworldly kind of meaning that gathers 
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a unique, transgressive charge precisely because the meaning of the past is ordinarily thought to 
stop where the present begins.  This force should not be neglected in considering contextualism's 
long and perhaps enduring appeal. 
It is appropriate to conclude by considering whether recent debates auger changing divisions 
of labor among history, literature, and international law.  Functionalist international law's need 
for a "pure" past has more or less required that it devalue historical scholarship departing from a 
quasi-antiquarian norm.  Since history that fails to obscure its presentist politics or rhetorical 
subjectivity cannot pass through the gates erected in ICJ Article 38, a second division of labor 
has long pertained between history and literature, and by extension historians and literary 
scholars.  In effect, literary studies embraced what history disavowed.  If contextualist history 
"evades the burden of critical engagement by retreating into the apparently disengaged stance of 
contextualist reconstruction," literary studies has felt freer to embrace "the fundamentally radical 
act of putting one's cards on the table."77  A history that confined itself to impartial description—
what Philip Sidney called the "bare was" and Selden called "meer narration"—meant that 
literature and literary scholarship could embrace more flexible temporalities and to wear their 
subjectivity, morality, and political commitments on their sleeves.  In other words, law's 
longstanding contract with historicism—contextualism as containment—created conditions that 
permitted literature and literary scholarship to exhibit features that, in certain respects, share 
more with law than with history.   
 But now that explicitly political international legal scholars trouble this division of labor 
by doing a committed, quasi-literary legal history—now, that is, that “it is no longer believable 
to claim that a theory of international law (or much else) could depend on an ultimately non-
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partisan way of knowing”—what challenges and opportunities arise?78  For one thing, an 
international legal field that looks more like literature and literary studies could be able to enjoy 
the pleasures of explicitness, inventiveness, and creativity.  A field less anxious about the 
boundary between international law and international politics could also be able to draw from a 
powerful set of resources more or less endemic to literature for creating “cross-temporal 
community” and for moving meaning through time.79  And it may also be able to borrow some of 
the moral authority that literature and literary studies often generate by openly displaying (or 
neglecting to cloak) their commitments.  Poets, as Philip Sidney wrote, have no inherent 
obligations to past lives or to particular doctrines or precedents.  Literary authority arises in part 
from this freedom.  As former US President Barack Obama told an audience at Carnegie Mellon 
University recently, "I was an English and Political Science major ... I have probably learned 
more from reading novels than reading textbooks."  Literature and literary scholarship can boast 
a long tradition in changing hearts and minds, and "makers" can teach and delight in part because 
they have "no law but wit."80   
But a note of caution is in order too.  While literature and literary studies have exerted great 
influence, they have done the vast majority of their teaching outside the institutional frameworks 
of international law.  ICJ Article 38 remains a powerful "tool for separating law from non-law," 
and poets, novelists, and literary scholars have little reasonable expectation to be admitted 
through its gate.81  This is not exclusively due to lack of disciplinary training either, for 
historians' scholarship is cited regularly.  Rather, literature and literary scholarship have largely 
done different jobs in the disciplinary division of labor in part because practitioners have been 
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unwilling to pay the requisite stylistic and substantive costs.  Ultimately, if international juridical 
method veers too close to literature and literary studies, it will find itself balancing similar risks. 
